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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the demand and cost structure of the French market of academic journals, taking 
into account its intermediary role between researchers, who are both producers and consumers of 
knowledge.  This two sidedness feature will echoes similar problems already observed in electronic 
markets – payment card systems, video game console etc - such as the chicken and egg problem, 
where readers won’t buy a journal if they do not expect its articles to be academically relevant and 
researchers, that live under the mantra “Publish or Perish”, will not submit to a journal with either 
limited public reach or weak reputation.  After the merging of several databases, we estimate the 
aggregated nested logit demand system combined simultaneously with a cost function.  We identify 
the structural parameters of this market and find that price elasticities of demand are quite large and 
margins relatively low, indicating that this industry experiences competitive constraints.   
 
 
 
Cet article analyse la demande et la structure de coût du marché français des revues scientifiques, tenant compte 
de son rôle intermédiaire entre les chercheurs, qui sont des producteurs et des consommateurs de la 
connaissance. Cette volonté de dispositif du sidedness deux fait écho les problèmes semblables déjà observés 
sur les marchés électroniques - les systèmes à cartes de paiement, la console etc.. de jeu vidéo - tel que le 
poulet et le problème d'oeufs, là où les lecteurs n'achèteront pas un journal s'ils ne s'attendent pas à ce que ses 
articles soient scolaire appropriés et chercheurs, ce de phase sous l'incantation "édite ou périt", ne soumettra pas 
à un journal avec l'une ou l'autre extension publique limitée ou réputation faible. Après le fusionnement de 
plusieurs bases de données, nous estimons le système niché agrégé de demande de logit combiné 
simultanément avec une fonction de coût. Nous identifions les paramètres structuraux de ce marché et 
constatons que les élasticités de la demande sont tout à fait grandes et des marges relativement basses, 
indiquant ce Th 
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Introduction 
 
 
This paper analyzes the demand and cost structure of the French market of academic journals, 
taking into account its intermediary role between researchers, who are both producers and consumers 
of knowledge.  This two sidedness feature will echoes similar problems already observed in electronic 
markets – payment card systems, video game console etc - such as the chicken and egg problem, 
where readers won’t buy a journal if they do not expect its articles to be academically relevant and 
researchers, who live under the mantra “Publish or Perish”, will not submit to a journal with either 
limited public reach or weak reputation.  Therefore, while on the consumer side, journals compete for 
subscriptions, on the producer side, journals compete for papers that would maximize the expected 
number of citations.   In this context, journals will have their price settled according to their ability to 
attract academically relevant articles.  
Taking academic journals as differentiated products, we rely on the recent developments of the 
empirical Industrial Organization literature to estimate the aggregated logit demand system combined 
simultaneously with a pricing function under the assumption of Bertrand competition.  We assume that 
the current business model among publishers is the readers-pay model and that the subscription pricing 
policies are determined oligopolistically.  Furthermore, by recognizing that the impact factor - our 
measure of journal’s number of citations – is determined by the public reach and the reputation of the 
journal, we introduce an additional equation that is able to capture the two-sidedness feature of the 
industry. 
Based on the merging of two important price databases, EBSCO and SWETS, together with 
the journal’s quality indicators provided by the Journal of Citations Report edited by ISI, we collected 
data covering the yearly subscription of journals by French universities from several domains of 
sciences and social sciences and their characteristics for the period 1994 to 2004.   We can show that 
French universities’ subscriptions are substantially elastic to the price of journal, with publishers 
seizing a relatively low mark-up.  Also, publishers that share non for profit (NFP) objectives price 
lower than for profit (FP) ones. 
The data also strongly supports the two-sidedness feature of academic journals.  Besides 
having a significantly positive effect on the demand, the impact factor has a negative impact on the 
costs of journals, indicating that journals with good reputation (a high citation record) experience 
lower costs.  Interestingly, we find that the impact factor among NFP journals is significantly higher 
than FP ones.   Another important result is that journals that have experienced a change of publishers 
in the last 10 years have a significantly higher impact factor than the others. 
The results obtained in this paper are striking and original.  They have implications not only 
on the way the competition analysis of the industry should be carried out but also on the way that 
publishers affect the scientific output as a certification vector and as a dissemination one. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the market of academic 
journals as a two sided market.  Section 3 presents the related literature, followed by section 4, which 
describes the database.  Section 5 presents the methodology applied and the results are presented in 
Section 6.  We conclude in Section 7. 
 
 
Academic Journals as Two Sided Platforms 
 
The last 20 years witnessed a huge innovation wave in the communications technology, specifically in 
digital communications.  Data storing and data transfer became accessible as never before and the 
‘data intermediation’ industry grew rapidly.  As the number of transactions grew exponentially in 
developed countries, the interest for the actual functioning of this industry among players and 
researchers grew proportionally. 
Developed in the late nineties, the two-sided market theory proposed an interpretation of how 
this renewed industry functions. The standard two-sided market models share a common feature: It 
stresses the fact that platforms that link two types of traders by some means are valued by the potential 
sizes of these two groups of users.  As such, the platforms’ pricing policy take network effects into 
account, adjusting its price structure according to the willingness-to-pay of each side of the market.  
An increase in prices on one side directly reduces its users’ participation, which, in turn, reduces the 
expected gain from the other side of the platform. Thus, in some circumstances, one side of the market 
could be subsidized by the other side. 
The insights provided by the theory carry out to different industries from payment systems to 
operating systems, shopping malls, video game consoles and media.1  One of our goals here is to 
assess the extent to which this paradigm applies to the market for academic journals. 
Academic researchers are both producers and consumers of knowledge.  Academic journals 
play an intermediary role of certification that unveils the dynamics of the profession: A researcher has 
to publish his studies to be evaluated and to be recognized as a professional.  So academic journals are 
the vector through which certified scientific information flows.  While the impact of the ‘Publish or 
Perish’ mantra on the research activity itself has consequences of its own on the scientific 
development of a society – and a normative analysis of the current status quo is of interest, but out of 
the scope of this study -, the role of publications on the ranking and funding of universities as well as 
criterion for promotion and tenure awarding of a researcher only sharpens the impact of the mantra on 
the research agenda. 
                                                 
1 See Rochet and Tirole (2003 and 2005) for a presentation of this new paradigm and latest developments. See 
Jullien (2004) for a review of the theoretical results applied to electronic markets. Armstrong (2005) has focused 
on media and the role of advertisement and content. 
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So, as a platform, an academic journal not only plays the traditional role of information flow 
management (i.e.; research output dissemination), but it also certifies the articles they publish, and 
therefore the authors.  Usually, a journal aims at publishing the articles that will be the most influential 
in the field for the years to come, that is, the articles that maximize the expected number of citations.  
The larger the number of citations a journal obtains, the stronger their attractiveness among readers.  
For that reason, journals compete for the best articles through referee committees, which select and 
screen the submitted articles. 
Now, the academic research community has strongly benefited from the decreasing costs of 
information processing and telecommunications.  Researchers face a completely different scenario 
from what was available some years ago.  They are able to run fairly complex programs in shorter 
time and to use internet as a medium to exchange ideas/papers and find relevant references. 
Thus, research output has increased sharply, which has raised tensions on the functioning of 
the traditional printed journals.  Cheap talks and anecdotic evidence indicated that, while the average 
time for a researcher to receive a first evaluation of its scientific paper has increased considerably, the 
variance of time taken to actually publish an accepted paper has increased even more, particularly for 
the most popular journals.  These features counteracted the increasing need for a faster access to 
scientific literature, itself fuelled by the increasing availability of easy-to-use communication systems. 
In this context, observers remark a lasting movement towards a reorganization of the academic 
journals.  The publishers reacted in twofold ways:  On the researchers’ market side, established 
publishers have launched new academic journals, which are more specialized and have faster 
refereeing procedures; on the readers and librarians’ side, the publishers proposed several value-added 
services and special journal packages that have become known as the Big Deal.  We briefly comment 
them in what follows. 
Concerning the researchers’ side, the reply to the increasing research output, driven by the 
sharp decrease of research costs, has been the creation of new journals in order to adjust to the 
differentiation of new research fields and the increased variance of the research quality. In the 
meantime, this flow of creation has certainly been boosted by the design of more efficient software 
(sometime freely available) to manage and edit journals.  The already feeble technological barrier in 
such industry decreased even further.  Notable, the for-profit publishers took the lead in the creation of 
new journals and, at present, they hold most of the recently created new journals. As a consequence, 
libraries concentrate much of their subscriptions on these publishers. (See Case, 2004, p.2 and 
Dewatripont et alii, 2005, p.44.) 
As regard the readers’ side, a typical contract between a library and a publisher would entail 
simple print and/or electronic versions, with added value services to libraries such as precise statistics 
on the number of electronic consultations and desktop electronic access.  One of the most notorious 
publishers’ initiatives in the last ten years has been what became known as the Big Deal.  This special 
contract differs from publisher to publisher but, its basic format consists of a multi-year contract that 
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bundles the journal’s printed version to its electronic one and has a limiting policy regarding 
cancellation of subscriptions.  Generally, this contract would be tied to the library, but also, publishers 
frequently would propose clauses based on the library’s previous subscriptions record.  Notably 
restrictive, the Big Deal has been sometimes considered as a strategic barrier to entry to competing 
new journals.2 
In summary, the two-sidedness nature of academic journals, that is to say, dissemination on one side 
towards researchers/consumers and certification on the other side to researchers/producers have been 
responsible for the impact of the electronic revolution on the dynamics of the market of academic 
journals, i.e., creation of new journals and the design of new contracts. 
 
 
The related literature 
 
To our knowledge, the first theoretical model that recognizes the two-sidedness feature of the 
academic journals market was developed by McCabe and Snyder (2005).  Their article focuses on the 
academic journal as a certification device, a role which allows readers to decrease their cost of reading 
papers.  The talent of the journal’s referee committee determines its ability to minimize the number of 
low quality articles that are accepted for publication.  Authors do not observe the quality of their paper 
ex-ante and the submission pricing policy is designed so as to attract as many submissions as possible.  
Under this framework, and provided that the private benefit of researchers from having a paper 
published is higher than the publication and refereeing costs, the subscription price is increasing with 
the quality (or talent) of the journal.  In other words, a journal that improves its refereeing process 
directly hurts the authors, whose perceived probability of having a paper accepted decreases, but 
directly benefits readers, that face a lower cost of reading the journal.  
Jeon and Rochet (2006) also characterize the market for not-for-profit academic journals as a 
two-sided market to study their pricing and quality policies.  Differently from McCabe and Snyder, the 
authors model academic journals as perfect certification devices, where quality is given endogenously 
with the pricing policy.  In such case, the referee procedure has the unique role of assigning which 
articles should be published and which should not.  In a world where the readers benefit from the 
quality of the published articles, but incur a fixed cost of reading them, and researchers benefit from 
the publication per se and from the quality of its paper, the first best pricing policy will be subsidizing 
readers.  Here, readers are creating externalities to researchers, who benefit from each one that reads 
his paper.  Under a budget balance constraint, the journal issue subscription prices equal to zero which 
corresponds to open access to readers.  Because there are not as many readers without subsidization, 
binding papers in terms of quality are not submitted and the average quality of the journal increases.  
                                                 
2 See Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) for a discussion on the Big Deal as a strategic barrier to entry. 
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Not-for-profit journals, whose objective function favours readers, would tend to decrease journal’s 
quality below optimal under open access while the effect would be reversed under the subscriber-pays 
model. 
Our empirical study is more related to McCabe and Snyder’s theoretical model with respect to 
the journal’s technology.  We recognize that journals differ across their ability (or talent) to detect the 
quality of a submitted article and, typically, a journal’s talent is a function of the journal’s perceived 
quality.  In fact, a high quality journal should have lower cost to hire a good referee committee, a 
willing full editorial board and, by that way maintains or even increases its reputation.  Because most 
of the referees are not paid (or paid symbolically) and reviewing is costly, the recruitment of referees 
is frequently based on the researchers’ expectation of having their own work published or on their 
motivation to build their reputation.  The same is true for hiring editorial boards, mainly with respect 
to reputation.  Since the reputation of a journal plays an important role on its current talent to screen 
the submitted articles, it seems only natural to assume that the latter is determined through an 
endogenous process, rather than deterministic, as in McCabe and Snyder.  In our analysis, we 
investigate the impact of talent on costs, using a proxy variable for the quality of a journal. 
Our approach to the publisher’s behaviour is different from Rochet and Jeon (2006).  While they study 
the behaviour of not-for-profit publishers, we assume publishers compete in prices a la Bertrand to 
maximize their profit.  In our estimations, we control for the existence of not-for-profit publishers.3.  
Finally, we are assuming that the publishers adopt the subscriber-pays model. 
A recent hedonic price study performed by Dewatripont et alii (2005) used one of the price 
databases adopted in our analysis. Among their conclusions, they found that there are large price 
differences across fields, controlling for total number of journals’ citations, not-for-profit journals 
price lower than for-profit ones and older journals price lower.  The total number of citations had a 
positive impact on prices.  Our results corroborate some of their findings and contribute with further 
insights on the functioning of the market. 
 
 
The Data 
 
Our database combines several sources.  The annual levels of subscription per journal are obtained 
from the information network of all French university libraries, ABES (Agence Bibliographique de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur).  Besides holding the integral of all their collections from 1994 to 2004, the 
subscription characteristics included the format and language of the journal and the nationality of the 
publisher. 
                                                 
3 Not For Profit journals are defined as all journals that belong to a University Press or Society type of publisher. 
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Other journals’ characteristics are obtained from the merger of two annual publications of the 
Journal of Citation Reports (JCR herein), (1) the Sciences Edition from 1994 to 2003 and (2) the 
Social Sciences Editions from 1994 to 1997, 1999 and 2003.  Journals’ characteristics for which we 
have data include the total number of citations, impact factor and cited half indexes, number of issues 
and articles, publisher and up to five (sub)fields covered.  The journals are selected according to their 
fields’ importance in the database.  The covered fields are Business, Chemistry, Computer Science, 
Economics, Engineering, Mathematics, Medicine Probability and Statistics, Physics and Psychology. 
The price variable is the combination of listed subscription prices given by the two main firms 
distributing journals in France, EBSCO and Swets Information Services.  They are among the 
worldwide leaders in providing information access and management solutions through print and 
electronic journal subscription services, research database development and production, online access 
to more than hundred databases and thousands of e-journals, and e-commerce book procurement.  The 
use of two different sources for obtaining the price variable is due to an important fall in the number of 
journals listed by EBSCO from 1998 onwards.4  This EBSCO price list is complemented by the Swets 
data, which covered the period from 2001 onwards.  Notably, some journals presented quite different 
price magnitudes and we have implemented a corrective program that would fix for such differences 
biased towards the magnitudes of the Swets’ prices, which core generally lower than EBSCO’s.5  The 
consequent lack of price information during the period 1998-2000 impacts its market share and price 
statistics.  We aim at controlling its effects during the estimation procedures.  Notably, the available 
price schedules are restricted to the basic per journal subscription, which abstracts from any of the 
quantity discounts publishers usually offer libraries.  The bundling of journals proposed by these 
contracts - the Big Deal is an example - are not explicitly covered by our database.  However, we have 
gathered data on the year the main publishers started offering electronic subscriptions to readers in the 
US which is an important feature of this type of contract, and we use it as a proxy to the French case. 6 
(See Case, 2004.) 
Additional data are obtained from other sources.  For instance, to understand the impact of the 
perceived concentration of publishers in the academic journals market led us to gather data on the 
merger activity of the industry among the main publishers.  We have combined this information with 
our data on publishers per journal. 
                                                 
4 One explanation for this fall in the number of journals with listed prices might be the rising of more complex 
subscription price menus, which led EBSCO to register them differently. 
5 Both EBSCO and Swets database presented prices that are wrongly coded in cents or in tens of cents, for which 
we apply a corrective algorithm.  Because Swets’ identified corrections accounted only for 0.13% of the data and 
EBSCO’s for 4.7%, we assume that Swets is more correct than EBSCO and take its price magnitudes as the 
correct ones. 
6 Another problem on our data on prices is that the price listing is irrespective of the journal’s format.  We 
assume the price is for the printed version only, though we know that libraries have subscribed some printed 
journals with the optional electronic version.  Once the printed version is subscribed, libraries sometimes are 
faced with its free either, free under constraints or paid electronic version.  We assume the libraries take the 
printed version, but we try to account in the estimated the fact that libraries are offered electronic formats.  
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An important drawback of this work is the lack of data on the costs of publishers.  We did not 
have access to this crucial data, which made especially more complicated the estimation of the model.  
As an alternative, we construct some proxy cost variables based on the journals and publishers’ 
information.  These variables include field and editor dummies, number of subscribed journals 
proposed by the publisher, the nationality of the publisher, number of issues per year, and some 
interactions between these variables.  We also include a dummy for not-for-profit publishers. 
The following tables provide summary descriptive statistics of variables that are used in the 
specifications we discuss below.  These variables include prices (in real dollars 2000), market shares, 
number of articles, total number of citations, impact factor and cited half index. 
The market share of a journal j at time t is defined as the number of universities that have at 
least one of its libraries subscribing to j at time t divided by the total number of journals available at 
time t.  The impact factor is a measure of the importance of citations of a journal which is the ratio of 
total cites in a current year of articles published in a given journal the previous two years over the total 
number of articles published the previous two years.  The cited half life index represents the minimum 
number of years back from the current year that allow to account for half of the total number of 
citations of the journal.  This last index measures in some sense the length of the citations’ lifecycle of 
a journal and will differ depending on the field of the journal.  As a preliminary remark, one should 
notice that the sample is quite asymmetric with respect to the selected characteristics, one exception 
being the cited half index.  
Table I gives the mean and median market shares and prices of the journals.  Although our 
definition of market share and our price adjustment algorithm have inflated the statistics for the period 
1998-2000, some trends are noticeable.7  The median market share of a journal has been decreasing 
steadily in the last ten years and prices increased likewise. 
Table II provides statistics on some basic characteristics of the journals.  Besides the sharp 
increase in the number of articles between 1998 and 2002, its median and mean have basically 
converged to the same number as 1994.  Nevertheless, the mean and median number of citations and 
the impact factor of a journal have increased considerably, which may be due to the higher number of 
articles together with lagged character of these quality measures.  The cited half index indicates a mild 
increase in the life cycle of the articles published by a typical journal.  Notably, the few journals that 
are covered by EBSCO during the period 1998-2000 do not differ in terms of citations and impact 
factor, but contribute to an increase in the mean and median number of articles. 
Table III provides the mean and median ratio between price and journal’s citation and between 
price and unit impact factor.  The median market share of a journal has been decreasing steadily in the 
last ten years and prices have not changed significantly. 
                                                 
7 As mentioned, Swets prices are lower than EBSCO prices.  The corrective algorithm adjusted prices 
downwards. 
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Table I :Descriptive statistics of prices and market shares per year 
Market Shares (a) Price (a), (b) Year 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Number of journals 
1994 0.0007188 0.0006072 1076.34 325.12 772 
1995 0.0006380 0.0004660 1262.13 365.30 818 
1996 0.0006314 0.0004817 1119.60 386.43 872 
1997 0.0006385 0.0004970 1243.25 410.40 889 
1998 0.0016411 0.0013736 1648.16 712.87 303 
1999 0.0017464 0.0015060 1489.85 773.40 307 
2000 0.0024651 0.0021142 1517.94 772.13 253 
2001 0.0004951 0.0003318 891.16 463.87 1038 
2002 0.0005142 0.0004031 964.08 513.98 1037 
2003 0.0004658 0.0003176 1013.02 542.69 1232 
2004 0.0004421 0.0002961 1105.39 589.33 1254 
Note:  (a) There is a fall in the number of observations between years 1998 and 2000, which, given our 
definition of market share, led to an artificial increase of the mean individual journal’s market share. 
Also, the observed different price magnitudes were adjusted through a corrective algorithm which 
adjusted the bias towards Swets prices’ magnitudes. Since many of the sampled journals during the 
years 1998-2000 are not present in the Swets database, the algorithm has not reached them, and price 
means are consequently higher. 
 (b) Simple annual means. 
 
 
Table II: Descriptive statistics of journals’ characteristics per year 
Year 
 
Number 
of 
Issues Number of articles 
Total Number of 
Citations a 
 
Impact Factor a Cited Half a 
  Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Median 
1994 6 160.5 97.0 3161 1161 1.5349 0.9029 6.6 
1995 6 168.5 101.5 3648 1257 1.6201 0.9109 6.8 
1996 6 173.6 102.0 3962 1358 1.6763 0.9955 6.8 
1997  8 170.3 100.5 4035 1373 1.5933 0.9534 6.9 
1998  12 229.6 133.0 5120 1802 1.7469 1.0365 6.7 
1999 10 218.1 117.0 5459 1504 1.6830 0.9325 6.9 
2000 12 229.6 143.0 5084 1981 1.6574 1.0400 6.8 
2001 11 199.9 126.0 5923 2270 2.0555 1.3518 6.9 
2002 12 192.8 119.0 5908 2338 2.0844 1.4158 7.1 
2003 8 175.2 98.0 5490 2000 2.0034 1.3236 7.3 
2004  8 166.6 96.6 4414 1498 1.7690 1.1264 6.7 
Note: (a) computed averages for 1998 and 2004. 
 
 
 
 
As discussed, the journals listed in JCR are characterized by up to 5 subfields of science.  
From a total of 219 subfields, we have selected the 10 most frequent domains of science by grouping 
the subfields into its respective major field.  For instance, journals with the subfields ‘Psychology, 
Applied’ and/or ‘Psychology, Biological’ were gathered into the field of Psychology; the journals with 
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subfields ‘Anatomy & Morphology’ and ‘Parasitology’ were gathered into Medicine.  Such procedure 
decreased the occurrence of overlapping (sub)fields from 50% to less than 1%.   
Table IV provides per field medians over some important journal’s characteristics.  It indicates 
that the academic appraisal of a journal and its consequent use in future research and final publication 
differs across fields.  Firstly, Medicine journals cover almost half of the database and have the highest 
median impact factor of the sample. 
 
 
Table III: Price per journal’s characteristics 
Year Price per citation Price per impact factor 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Number of journals 
1994 2.3573 0.3474 2103.52 456.27 772 
1995 2.3877 0.3591 1945.39 504.75 818 
1996 1.8538 0.3370 1666.35 467.87 872 
1997 2.0781 0.3414 1863.38 488.32 889 
1998 a 3.0818 0.3929 2874.46 644.59 303 
1999 2.9678 0.5068 2753.92 706.50 307 
2000 2.4624 0.4053 2890.58 670.25 253 
2001 0.9761 0.2582 1037.94 374.49 1038 
2002 1.0248 0.2744 999.03 395.42 1037 
2003 0.7527 0.3244 997.57 438.87 1232 
2004 a 1.1782 0.4575 1264.50 556.47 1254 
Note: (a) computed averages. 
 
Table IV: Subscribed journals’s characteristics per field (medians) 
Fields 
Impact Factor 
 
Number of 
Articles 
Price in 2000 
dollars 
Market Share 
% 
Mathematics 0.55294 60 552.61 9 
Economics 0.58974 39 321.33 6 
Engineering 0.61716 103 569.07 12 
Computer Science 0.62000 54 648.07 4 
Probability and Statistics 0.65809 49.5 210.49 3 
Business 0.68493 38 306.49 3 
Psychology 1.25022 41 280.79 4 
Physics 1.37632 194 1379.14 5 
Chemistry 1.68600 240 1394.37 7 
Medicine 1.84971 150.5 443.54 47 
Total          
 
 
 
Secondly, we find that some fields have a different citation dynamics than others and that 
median prices differ considerably across fields.  Notably, Physics and Chemistry’s are far more 
expensive than any other field.  Given these characteristics, field specificity seems relevant to properly 
capture the network effect of academic journals.  We address it in our estimates.  
We finally turn to the publishers characteristics.  The Academic Publishing industry is among 
the one that most seized the mergers and acquisitions wave of the 90’s.  From a total of 262 
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publishers, we have chosen the most representative of the sample and controlled for their merger 
activity; they are: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Cambridge University Press, Reed Elsevier, Wolters 
Kluwer, Oxford University Press, Sage Publication Ltd., Springer Science, Taylor & Francis Group 
PLC and John Wiley and Sons Inc, Lippincott Williams & Wilkings (Monroe, 2005).  By far, Elsevier 
is the publisher with the highest market share, followed by Blackwell and Springer.  According to our 
sample, the major publishers’ field profile is quite similar: Most of them have around 45% journals 
covering Medicine. Among them, Wolters Kluwer is the most diversified one while Lippincott is 
specialized in Medicine only journals. 
 
 
Econometric Specification and Estimation 
 
Until recent, the estimation of demand systems of differentiated products was subject to two major 
drawbacks: (1) the need to fully characterize the substitution pattern between products implied the 
estimation of the squared number of the existing products, framed as the dimensionality problem, and 
(2) the introduction of heterogeneity between consumers, which is expected in a differentiated 
products’ market.   
The discrete choice literature provides solutions to both problems.8  The dimensionality 
problem was solved by casting preferences in terms of the space of the products’ characteristics (and 
not in terms of the much larger space of products).  The consumer’s heterogeneity is translated 
through distributional assumptions whose coefficients are estimated.  The most popular model in this 
class is the simple logit model based on the assumption of a i.i.d. extreme value distribution.  
However, it is well know that this assumption is strong with regard the characterization of the 
consumers' substitutions patterns.  In order to overcome such limitations, more flexible forms have 
been proposed and among them we find the nested-logit and its generalized form, the random 
coefficients discrete choice model.  With respect to the simple logit, the nested logit adds more 
structure to the consumer heterogeneity by replacing the i.i.d. extreme value assumption of the random 
term with a variance components structure.  By grouping the products in well defined and mutually 
exclusive groups, the consumer is allowed to have a common shock across products within the same 
group.  In this nested-logit framework, the probability of a consumer choosing a product belonging to 
the same group is higher than choosing just any other product. 
Among the advantages of the random coefficients discrete choice model is the further 
generalization of the substitution pattern among products. (See Nevo, 1998).  This time, it accounts for 
a weighted average of the consumers’ price sensitivity, where the weight is the individual consumer’s 
probability of purchase.  Another advantage of this framework is that it prevents the a priori 
                                                 
8 To cite a few (and be unfair to many): McFadden (1973, 1984), Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
(1995), Goldberg (1995), Nevo (1997). 
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segmentation of the market, which can be a problem in markets where such segmentation is not so 
clear. (See, for the case for personal computers, Bresnahan et alii, 1997.) 
Although the nested model still holds limitations on the substitution pattern with respect to the 
random coefficients discrete choice model, we have opted for this framework here because it is 
simpler to implement and because the grouping of journals is fairly straightforward.9  We now turn to 
the econometric estimation of a structural model of competition between publishers of journals on the 
market for academic journal subscriptions by French university libraries. 
The following section describes the model.  We have also performed per field analysis for 
journals in Medicine and Economics, to which cases we have adopted the simple logit demand 
framework. 
 
The Model  
The representative consumer is a university library, which decides for buying one of the available 
academic journals, based on the researchers it represents, which varies according to the field and to the 
quality of their research output. The library might also buy an outside alternative or not buy any 
journal at all. 
The nested demand framework assumes products are classified in G different groups plus the 
group corresponding to the outside alternative.  In the context of academic journals, journals are 
classified according to different fields of science.  In this framework, journals of the same field are 
closer substitutes than journals outside the field.  The utility of subscribing a journal j by consumer i is 
given by: 
 
 (1 )ij j ig iju δ ε σ ε= + + − . (1) 
 
We do not include the time subscript t for the sake of simplicity. 
The component jδ  in equation (1) represents the average utility of journal j and it is common 
to all consumers.  It is decomposed in three parts.  More formally, the average utility is: 
 
 j j j j jX I pδ β ρ α ξ= + − + . (2) 
 
The first part, βjX , includes the  journal’s characteristics in βjX  such as number of articles, number 
of issues, field, dummies for major publishers, their nationality, year dummies and some interactions 
                                                 
9 There are 316 out of 3468 journals with overlapping fields, mainly for Computer Science, Engineering and 
Mathematics. The assignment of a journal to a field followed an arbitrary order.  Once we look at the statistics 
per field, we can see that these fields share very similar characteristics.  Furthermore, given its low 
representation of the data, less than 1%, we are confident that the assignment procedure will not mislead 
estimates in a relevant way. 
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between them.  The second part, Ij, includes the quality of the journal, that is, the scientific importance 
of its published papers.  The third part is the price of the journal, where the parameter α represents the 
disutility of price of a journal and should be positive.  Finally jξ  represents the unobserved 
components of quality. 
The second and the third elements in equation (1), namely igε  and ijε  are random variables 
that reflect the difference between the consumer’s individual appraisal over the journal and the 
average payoff it delivers, represented by jδ .  Notably, igε  is common to all journals belonging to the 
same field g and ijε  is specific to the journal j itself.  The multiplicative parameter σ  ranges between 
0 and 1 and denotes the degree of intragroup correlation.  It measures the correlation of the 
consumer’s utility from journals that belong to the same field.  The closer this parameter is to one, the 
higher the chance the consumer will switch to another journal within the same field when its price 
increases.  When σ  is close to zero, the consumer does not make distinction between fields when 
subscribing a journal.  This case corresponds to the standard logit model in which all journals are 
symmetric.  When σ  is close to one, the journals within a field are considered as very close 
substitutes. 
The library i subscribes the journal j that maximizes her utility.  In order to compute the 
probability that a library subscribes a journal j, the nested logit model assumes that both igε  and ijε  
are such that its composite term (1 )ig jtε σ ε+ −  follows an extreme value distribution.  The average 
utility of the outside alternative is normalized to zero, that is, 00 =δ .   Thus, the probability sj of a 
library to subscribe journal j is given by: 
 
 
∑
=
−
−
+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−= G
g
g
g
g
j
j
D
D
D
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1
1
1
1
)1(exp
σ
σσ
δ
, (3) 
where ∑
∈
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
gGk
k
gD )1(exp σδ . 
 At the aggregate level, the choice probability, sj, coincides with the market share of the journal 
j.  The total number of subscriptions of journal j, say qj, is directly given by expression qj=sjN.  
Following Berry (1994), we can rewrite equation (3) to yield the demand equation: 
 
 0ln ln lnj j j j jg js s X I p sβ ρ α σ ξ− = + − + + , (4) 
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where jgs  is the market of journal j in group g and 0s  is the market share of the outside good.  Given 
our definition of market share of a journal, that is, the number of universities that have at least one of 
its libraries subscribing to journal j at time t divided by the total number of journals available at time t, 
we include as outside good all the journals that were not subscribed at period t, though they were 
available in the previous years. 
We assume that each publisher f produces a set of journals Ff.  Its net profit is the sum of its 
operational profits minus a fixed cost K.  The operational profit of journal j is equal to the product of 
its total subscriptions and the margin, that is, the price pj minus the marginal cost cj of journal j.  Then, 
still omitting subscript t, the total profit of firm f is:   
 
 ( )∑
∈
−−=
fFj
jjjf Kqcpπ . (5) 
 
Publishers compete in prices à la Nash-Bertrand.  Given the nested logit specification of the demand, 
the pricing equation for each journal is given by: 
 
 1
(1 (1 ) )j j fg f
p c
s s
σ
α σ σ
−= − − − − , (6) 
 
where fgs  is the publisher f’s market share in field g; fs  is the publisher f’s overall market share and 
jc is the (constant) marginal cost of journal j.  The marginal cost of a journal j is parameterized as: 
 
 )exp( jjj wc ωγ += , (7) 
 
where wj is the vector of the deterministic part of the journal’s characteristics, γ  is the technological 
parameters to be estimated and jω  is an unobserved random part.  The deterministic part includes a 
constant term, number of issues per year, number of journals subscribed per publisher, impact factor, 
dummies for fields, years, major publishers, nationality of the publisher, for non for profit journals and 
some interactions between them.  Notably, we include the impact factor as cost characteristic.  It 
should be capturing a reduced form of the journal’s effort towards having a high quality journal.  We 
would expect that the higher the impact factor of the journal, the lower is the cost for the journal to 
find good referee committees and a willingfull editorial board.  For these reasons, journals with lower 
impact factor should have higher cost than journals with high impact factor.  Therefore, we expect the 
effect of the impact factor to be negative on costs.  This conjecture is related to the model of McCabe 
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and Snyder (2005), since the impact factor would be a measure of the talent a journals has in screening 
the good articles out of the submitted ones.   
 Finally, the per field analysis will correspond to the same structural model, applied to the 
simple logit framework, where σ  equals zero.  The market shares are redefined as jg js s= , which is 
the number of universities that have at least one of its libraries subscribing to the Medicine (or 
Economics) journal j at time t divided by the total number of Medicine (or Economics) journals 
available at time t,  We include as outside good all the respective field journals that were not 
subscribed at period t, though they were available in the previous years.   
 
Endogenous quality 
Journals provide the service of publishing certified articles and, as such, intermediate 
researchers/producers and readers.  These would attribute value to the journal that, respectively, has a 
large readership base and publishes good quality articles, which generates the chicken&egg problem 
commonly found in the context of two-sided markets.  Here, such value is approximated by the lagged 
impact factor.  Furthermore, according to JCR (2006), many factors “(…) can influence citation rates, 
such as language, journal history and format, publication schedule and subject specialty.”  Thus, given 
the highly endogenous nature of the impact factor, we further specify the simultaneous model by 
adding the following equation10: 
 
 1jt jt j jtI I Z uλ θ−= + + , (8) 
 
where itI  the impact factor of journal j at time t, jZ  is a vector of journals’ characteristics.  Following 
JCR’s expertise and the recent developments in the two-sided market theory, this matrix includes the 
number of articles and issues per year, a dummy for non-for-profit journals, some field dummies, a 
step dummy indicating a change of publisher.  Finally, 1jtI −  is the lagged impact factor of the journal j. 
The parameter λ  would be capturing the network effect of the past readership of the journal.   
 
Estimation results on the complete sample 
We first provide results for the complete sample. The estimation results of the field analysis are briefly 
discussed afterwards.  
 Table A1a and A1b (See Appendix) present the set of empirical results taking into account the 
endogeneity of prices.  We run the nested logit demand (Equation 4) combined simultaneously with 
the pricing Equation 6.  The first column of the regression output tables provide the results when the 
                                                 
10 Since prices are positively correlated to the quality of a journal, not accounting for this relation would 
underestimate the effect of the impact factor on the demand for journals. 
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impact factor is not accounted and then, in a second column, when it is accounted as exogenous, which 
we call the benchmark.  The following columns show the estimation results when the impact factor is 
endogenous.  The last two columns present the results when we include the impact factor Equation 8, 
which would be capturing the two sided nature of this market. 
Given the need to control for journals’ prices and quality endogeneity, our choice of 
instruments was guided by the need to include the variables that are linked to price and quality, but do 
not affect the unobserved demand shocks.  A natural list of instruments, in this case, includes the 
competitors’ characteristics.  The full list of instruments is presented on Table A2. 
The first regression output without the impact factor as explanatory variable is displayed in the 
first column of Table A1a and it is called  Model 1.  The second column (Model 2), the benchmark 
case, shows that not recognizing the endogenous character of the impact factor yields a zero 
correlation between impact factor and the demand for journals.  This result is counterintuitive since it 
implies that subscriptions would be unrelated with the impact factor, which is a celebrated measure of 
the quality of a journal.  Once we allow for the impact factor to be endogenous (Models 3 and 4), its 
effect on demand becomes statistically significant and with the expected positive sign.  
The fifth and the sixth columns present the results for the simultaneous model including the 
third equation, which will capture the network effect through the journal’s previous impact factor.  
Notably, this effect is positive and highly significant.  Additionally, the introduction of the impact 
factor equation does not change the effect of the impact factor on the demand, but it increases the 
estimated value of σ , our measure of intragroup correlation.  The implications of such change on our 
structural estimates for demand and costs will echo the theory’s prediction that the market becomes 
more competitive when two-sidedness is accounted. 
Some side results from the estimates of the third equation are worth mentioning.  The number 
of issues of a journal is weakly and positively correlated with the quality of the journal and the NFP 
journals usually have higher impact factor.  Interestingly, the impact factor is not statistically affected 
by changes in the ownership structure of journals.11.  The field dummies indicate the importance of 
accounting for the specificities of a field citation pattern. In particular, Medicine and Chemistry have a 
quite distinct citation pattern when compared to other fields. 
The estimates for the major publishers’ dummies indicate that they have a statistically 
negative effect on the impact factor when compared to the other publishers and their effect, with 
exception of Kluwer and Taylor & Francis are quite similar between each other.  At last, the electronic 
dummy, which is a step dummy for the year these major publishers started offering the electronic 
version of the journal (bundled or not with the printed version) is positively correlated with the impact 
                                                 
11 One would expect that the merging activity of the last years has been concentrated among the journals with the 
highest quality/prestige in academics, which would indicate that the publishers’ choice towards buying a journal 
could not be considered deterministic.  If we add this dummy in the list of endogenous variables of the model, its 
effect is positive and highly significant. 
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factor.  This indicates that the publishers were successful in using the electronic format to increase the 
quality of their own journals. 
The cost-side parameters have the expected signs for all the model specifications. The 
estimated coefficients for number of issues and the constant are positive and significantly different 
from zero.  The coefficient for the impact factor is significantly positive and, once taken as an 
endogenous variable, it becomes negative and statistically different from zero.  In other words, when 
we fail to recognize the endogenous character of the impact factor on the cost function, we find that 
the best journals are the ones with higher cost.  As discussed before, such result is not intuitive 
because one would expect that well-established high quality journals have a lower cost to run a journal 
with the suitable editorial board and refereeing committees than a lower quality journal.  This estimate 
would be capturing the reduced form of the effort a journal makes towards publishing high quality 
papers.  If one take such variable as a measure of the talent of journals – and here we refer to McCabe 
(2005)’s work -, we verify that journals indeed differ with respect to their talent to select articles. 
We find that as we improve the specification of the model, the sign of the estimate of the non-
for-profit (NFP) dummy changes from positive when we do not include the impact factor in the 
estimations to negative, when we include it as exogenous, to finally become positive and at 10% 
significance level in our preferred specification.  The empirical literature on academic journals usually 
finds that NFP journals price lower than for-profit (FP) ones.  Our result implies that such pricing 
policy would not be due to lower costs - according to our estimates, such journals seize higher costs – 
but do a deliberate strategy to price lower.   
The role of the dummies for nationality of the journal is very relevant for the estimates of both 
the impact factor and the NFP dummy estimates on the cost function.  If we do not control for 
nationality, the effect of NFP dummy on the cost becomes negative and the effect of the impact factor 
becomes positive.  One interpretation, suggested in Dewatripont et alii (2005), is that the change of 
currency in Europe, together with the appreciation of the Euro against the dollar on 2001 led to a 
significant increase in the price of the journals and such would be responsible for the bias usually 
found in the recent literature that the NFP journals, which are more frequent in the US are less 
expensive than the FP journals, which are more frequent in Europe.  However, a close look at our 
merged database yields average prices that are quite similar across countries for both FP and NFP 
publishers, except for UK.  There, the average price of its FP journals is the double of NFP journals, 
even though their quality is lower.  Therefore, in a context where UK data is responsible for almost 
half of the observations (2026 FP journals and 65 NFP journals out of 3956 observations), we find 
relevant to control for such idiosyncrasies with some country dummies. 
Finally, we turn to the demand-side parameters.  Notably, while α  varies very little across the 
model specifications, the same is not true for the estimated σ .  The different specifications yield 
slightly different estimates, which range from 0.91 to 0.95.  The associated first R-squares, which 
roughly speaking measures the fraction of the variation of prices (with the associated parameter α ) 
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and market shares (with the associated parameter σ ) that are explained through the instruments, also 
changes considerably and for both parameters.  Regarding σ , it clearly increases when we improve 
the specification towards the Full Model.  The same is not true for α : Depending on the choice of 
instruments, the first R-squared either decreases or increases.  We have favoured the specification that 
yields the highest first R-squared for α .  Therefore, our preferred structural estimates are based on the 
estimation results of the last column of Table A1b, the Model 6. 
Notably, the lack of more precise information on costs, such as wage paid by publisher, 
number of pages, surface of the journal, expenses with material are taking its toll. Our estimates on the 
(short run) costs are not as precise as one would like it to be.   
 
Empirical Analysis 
Table V compares the key structural estimates derived from the model where impact factor is 
exogenous (Model 2) with the results from the model including the impact factor equation (Model 6).  
We have captured a remarkable feature with the available data:  Our estimates reveal that the demand 
for academic journals is highly elastic, under both scenarios.  On the top of that, the estimated 
elasticity increases once we introduce the impact factor equation, corroborating the results obtained in 
the two-sidedness theoretical literature.  As discussed in a previous section, an increase in prices 
creates a multiplicative effect since it directly reduces the number of (paying) readers which in turn 
reduces the expected gain from researchers to publish in the journal. 
The estimates for the marginal cost do not vary much from one specification to the other.  
However the pricing policy and therefore the mark-up changes considerably, decreasing by 43%, 
when we use the complete model including the impact factor equation.  Nevertheless, given that the 
estimated elasticities are already very high under the benchmark model, the estimated average mark-
ups are low, around 9.8%, and reduces to 5.5% under the complete model. The median of the annual 
marginal cost of a journal is around $668 (2000 USD) and its average is close to $1081 the complete 
model. 
Note that the aggregated elasticity, that is, the percent change of the inside good market share 
resulting from a one percent increase in their prices, almost does not changed from one model to the 
other since α  does not change significantly.  Its estimated value is 0.52. 
The following Table VI and Table VII present the key structural statistics per publisher.  From 
a total of 262 publishers, we have chosen the most representative of the sample.  Notably, Elsevier, 
John Wiley & Sons Inc and Springer are the publishers with the highest individual journal elasticities.  
Because of the high values of elasticities, the economic margins are quite low.  For our selected 
publishers, the median ranged from 2% to 8.6%, while the overall median economic margin is around 
4%.  In particular, Elsevier, which accounts for almost half of our sample, John Wiley & Sons Inc and 
Springer has a median marginal cost slightly above the overall median journal 
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Table V: Estimated demand and cost parameters 
                  
  Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity Marginal Cost Mark Up (Percentage)
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Model 1 -29.01 -18.28 0.53 0.11 1058.64 645.1 9.808 6.917 
Model 6 -52.27 -32.94 0.99 0.20 1081.26 668.69 5.555 3.851 
                  
 
 
 
Table VI: Estimated demand elasticities per publisher 
  
Model 1: Impact Factor Exogenous         
  Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity Cross Editor Elasticity 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Blackwell -12.30 -10.49 0.13172 0.03373 0.00111 0.00044 
Cambridge -13.60 -11.85 0.20007 0.10946 0.00091 0.00039 
Elsevier -35.00 -23.42 0.77442 0.18713 0.00369 0.00113 
Ieee -12.38 -11.57 0.37429 0.11395 0.00120 0.00042 
Kluwer -23.53 -20.55 0.27123 0.17629 0.00086 0.00061 
Lippincot -15.53 -15.31 0.05177 0.02026 0.00128 0.00049 
Oxford -13.86 -12.39 0.11259 0.03347 0.00098 0.00057 
Sage -9.66 -7.85 0.10777 0.07973 0.00034 0.00022 
Springer -39.71 -29.31 0.44324 0.11494 0.00243 0.00110 
Taylor -21.99 -15.73 0.21110 0.07180 0.00091 0.00052 
Wiley -44.93 -34.00 0.58493 0.18916 0.00309 0.00121 
Model 6: Impact Factor Endogenous with Equation       
  Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity Cross Editor Elasticity 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Blackwell -22.17 -18.88 0.24651 0.06238 0.00111 0.00044 
Cambridge -24.50 -21.36 0.37510 0.20522 0.00091 0.00039 
Elsevier -63.05 -41.79 1.45188 0.34988 0.00368 0.00113 
Ieee -22.29 -20.85 0.70222 0.21376 0.00119 0.00042 
Kluwer -42.40 -37.05 0.50882 0.33045 0.00086 0.00061 
Lippincot -28.00 -27.60 0.09613 0.03763 0.00127 0.00049 
Oxford -24.98 -22.33 0.21065 0.06189 0.00098 0.00057 
Sage -17.41 -14.14 0.20215 0.14816 0.00034 0.00022 
Springer -71.56 -52.83 0.83068 0.21356 0.00242 0.00110 
Taylor -39.63 -28.35 0.39582 0.13405 0.00091 0.00052 
Wiley -80.96 -61.29 1.09630 0.35472 0.00308 0.00121 
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Table VII: Estimated marginal costs and mark-ups per publisher 
Model 1: Impact Factor Exogenous         
  Marginal Cost Mark Up (Percentage) Market Shares 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Blackwell 423.78 358.92 15.35848 10.44086 0.00099 0.00040 
Cambridge 480.06 406.77 12.35638 8.91958 0.00082 0.00040 
Elsevier 1282.88 826.00 9.81868 6.71697 0.00112 0.00047 
Ieee 427.16 383.34 13.85983 12.38679 0.00106 0.00047 
Kluwer 856.21 740.16 5.54937 5.14481 0.00051 0.00033 
Lippincot 542.87 531.79 9.24485 7.63821 0.00104 0.00033 
Oxford 486.87 431.59 11.35488 8.23335 0.00098 0.00048 
Sage 329.33 262.81 14.20512 13.03759 0.00046 0.00047 
Springer 1470.29 1064.61 5.13561 3.59331 0.00068 0.00040 
Taylor 796.70 561.05 8.24381 6.67901 0.00059 0.00040 
Wiley 1672.17 1247.36 4.00966 3.10001 0.00095 0.00040 
Model 6: Impact Factor Endogenous with Equation       
  Marginal Cost Mark Up (Percentage) Market Shares 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Blackwell 443.30 376.46 8.61430 5.83140 0.00099 0.00040 
Cambridge 497.49 427.27 6.86448 4.95268 0.00082 0.00040 
Elsevier 1309.15 855.23 5.63102 3.78966 0.00112 0.00047 
Ieee 450.17 408.13 7.83673 7.14305 0.00106 0.00047 
Kluwer 873.84 757.40 3.08487 2.86009 0.00051 0.00033 
Lippincot 562.19 551.66 5.15120 4.26238 0.00104 0.00033 
Oxford 504.26 449.01 6.30695 4.57131 0.00098 0.00048 
Sage 346.44 280.32 7.88675 7.24533 0.00046 0.00047 
Springer 1488.49 1082.20 2.85683 2.00391 0.00068 0.00040 
Taylor 813.97 578.51 4.57709 3.72032 0.00059 0.00040 
Wiley 1690.34 1264.77 2.22926 1.72687 0.00095 0.00040 
              
Note: The average market share of the outside option is around 45%. 
 
 
 
Summing up, our complete model led us to significant increase in our estimates for the 
elasticities.  This result is due to the multiplicative effect of price increases in the context of the two-
sided market as discussed above. Recall that the starting point of our analysis is the assumption that 
the relevant business model is the reader-pays model, where the publishers concentrate their profit on 
readers.  The implied assumption under this framework is that publishers look at two features of the 
market: (1) how much surplus they can extract from the each part of the market and (2) how elastic 
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these parts are.  In this setup, our estimation yields a quite elastic demand for journals.  If our 
assumptions are correct, the publishers consider that the surplus to be extracted from readers/libraries 
to be higher than from the one that could be extracted from researchers, as the readers’ willingness to 
have access to a journal is higher than the researcher’s willingness to publish an article in a journal.  
 
Results for the field analysis 
We have performed field analysis for journals in Medicine and Economics.  The main goal of this 
section is to provide the extent our estimates for own-price elasticities are sensitive to our definition of 
market-share.  We find that elasticities remain high enough under the reduced samples, with editors 
seizing around 15% median mark-up.  We also find that university libraries experience higher 
aggregate elasticities for both fields when compared to the overall sample.  Such higher aggregate 
elasticity might reflect the effects of the simpler assumptions of the logit model or by the fact that we 
are able to identify a higher substitution effect among domains that it could be expected. 
 
The Journals in Medicine 
Given the importance of Medicine journals in our sample, we have performed the same analysis to this 
restricted sample.  This field is characterized by important price and impact factor disparities across 
subfields, leading us to, besides controlling for the most fashionable fields, further characterize the 
demand with nonlinearity on the impact factor and interaction with NFP dummy.  We have withdrawn 
from the data corresponding to years 1998 to 2000. 
We find that price elasticities are high and that the two-sidedness holds for the field, that is, 
price elasticities increase once we account for the endogenity of the impact factor. However, when 
comparing these results with the complete sample ones, we find that, although our estimates for the 
alpha have slightly increased, individual price elasticities have reduced considerably, from a median of 
-33 to -12.6.  In the light of our definition of market shares, such result is expected in elasticity 
formulas of a logit estimation.  Besides, not only the individual journal’s market share have increased 
as regard the whole sample market shares, but also prices have decreased since the observations 
corresponding to years 1998 to 2000 were withdrawn from the sample.  Publishers seize consequently 
higher mark-ups with a median of 13.3% and an average 16.7%.  The median marginal costs is around 
413 while the average is of 717 real dollars 2000. (See Tables A1M, A2M, A3M and A4M in 
appendix.) 
 The mean aggregate elasticity, which corresponds to the effect on the demand for subscribing 
Medicine journals if all their prices increase by 1% ceteris paribus, is around -2.62.  Such higher 
aggregate elasticity reflects the fact that libraries might be reacting to price increases by substituting 
medicine journals for publications in other fields. 
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Elsevier, which is among one of the major supplier of journals in our sample, seizes a higher 
mark-up on Medicine only journals than when compared to all sample. 
 
The Journals in Economics 
The analysis for journals in Economics12 revealed a considerably high elastic demand with publishers 
seizing a median mark-up of 16.4%.  (See Tables A1E, A2E and A3E in appendix.)  Nonetheless, 
although the estimate is higher than on the overall sample, estimated elasticities are lower.  Again, 
such results are led by the sensitivity of own-price elasticities to prices under the (nested) logit 
framework when the market share is small.  The fact that journals in Economics are cheaper than a 
typical journal leads to lower price elasticities and higher mark-ups, everything being equal.   
The estimated aggregate elasticity is slightly higher than Medicine journals, with libraries 
reducing by 2.68 their demand for an increase of 1% in all Economics journals.  For this field, we 
cannot confirm whether two-sidedness is important in this field.  Probably, a further characterization 
of these journals is in need. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the market for academic journals subscriptions by French university 
libraries during the period 1994 to 2004.  By merging two important datasets on prices, EBSCO and 
Swets, and journal’s characteristics, JCR, with data on French university library subscriptions, we are 
able to characterize the properties of the demand and the extent of which two-sided markets are 
relevant. We also characterize some aspects of the industry’s technology.  
Firstly, we find that library subscriptions are substantially elastic to the price of journals. 
Although the lack of some information on prices of a number of journals and the lack of better 
information about the editing and publishing costs per journal prevent us to identify more precisely the 
structural parameters on this market, both own and cross price elasticities of demand are quite large 
and margins relatively low, indicating that competition is important in this industry. 
We are able to identify some important features of the industry.  Above all, our data confirms 
the relevance of the two-sidedness on the industry.  We do not find evidence that the impact factor of a 
journal is correlated with change of publishers.  Another side result is that NFP journals, that is, 
journals published by academic societies or university press are of better quality than others. 
On the cost side, we find that journals differ across their ability to select good articles.  A high 
quality journal normally enjoys lower costs of hiring a high level editorial board and motivated 
                                                 
12 Data corresponding to years 1998 to 2000 have been also withdrawn. 
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referees.  It is expected that these journals require lower effort to publish a good selection of articles.  
We cannot confirm the common perception that NFP journals have lower costs than FP journals.  
The results obtained in this paper are striking and original.  They have implications not only 
on the way the competition analysis of the industry should be carried out but also on the way 
publishers affect the scientific output. 
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Appendix 
Table A1a: Econometric estimates of the model for journal subscriptions by university libraries 
Without Impact factor equation
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage
Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared
Constant -4.08705 -13.97 -4.10884 -14.04 -3.98146 -13.09
Economics 0.44419 2.79 0.449179 2.82 0.47454 2.97
Engineering 0.628685 5.2 0.635442 5.25 0.66266 5.43
Mathematics 0.995996 7.4 1.003438 7.46 1.023288 7.59
Physics 1.693018 10.7 1.689671 10.77 1.693934 10.94
Chemistry 1.488064 10.09 1.470139 9.98 1.466018 10.07
Probability and Statistics -0.95153 -4.67 -0.9441 -4.64 -0.96976 -4.74
Medicine 2.451146 7.12 2.437632 7.08 2.511206 7.2
Issues per year 0.177121 21.8 0.176251 22.49 0.175304 24.69
Impact Factor 0.014928 1.19 0.023007 1.76 0.939
ELSEVIER 0.200854 1.55 0.211478 1.62 0.232468 1.78
ELSEVIER*UK 1.293551 7.35 1.293101 7.41 1.272103 7.42
BLACKWELL 0.191346 1.47 0.203745 1.56 0.215362 1.65
SPRINGER 0.763864 2.79 0.763206 2.79 0.763945 2.8
WILEY 1.824594 10.82 1.831943 11.01 1.828038 11.26
TAYLOR 0.72413 3.32 0.742627 3.4 0.747369 3.43
KLUWER 0.959837 3.17 0.958162 3.17 0.962167 3.19
US 0.158256 0.59 0.145887 0.55 0.145659 0.55
UK 0.652514 2.4 0.638109 2.34 0.639298 2.35
FR 0.055973 0.17 0.063682 0.19 0.07956 0.24
DE 1.852585 4.96 1.846823 4.95 1.847062 4.97
Med*US -0.56447 -1.6 -0.57966 -1.65 -0.59589 -1.69
Med*UK -0.91177 -2.64 -0.92571 -2.68 -0.93436 -2.71
Med*DE -0.91408 -2.24 -0.91489 -2.24 -0.91646 -2.25
Med*FR -0.64913 -1.54 -0.6462 -1.53 -0.66056 -1.57
1996 -0.20412 -1.59 -0.19992 -1.56 -0.20972 -1.62
1997 -0.14783 -1.17 -0.14606 -1.16 -0.15749 -1.24
1998 -0.19104 -1.09 -0.18296 -1.05 -0.2241 -1.27
1999 0.099966 0.6 0.10277 0.61 0.053275 0.31
2000 0.688958 3.85 0.69518 3.88 0.646045 3.55
2001 -0.22158 -1.96 -0.21613 -1.92 -0.22018 -1.9
2002 0.106405 0.87 0.106357 0.87 0.105055 0.85
2003 0.323207 2.73 0.322196 2.72 0.321342 2.68
2004 1.641693 11.02 1.63097 10.95 1.666785 10.79
Constant 4.921391 34.68 4.881444 33.87 5.134461 29.08
Economics -0.21594 -3.13 -0.19896 -2.89 -0.26084 -3.54
Engineering 0.192847 3.61 0.221148 4.1 0.099675 1.53
Mathematics 0.38408 6.24 0.41865 6.68 0.259388 3.24
Physics 0.652857 9.34 0.649329 9.26 0.656389 8.8
Chemistry 0.612726 9.59 0.579641 9.11 0.671972 9.82
Probability and Statistics -0.53322 -5.2 -0.52809 -5.1 -0.50555 -4.74
Medicine 0.291756 1.94 0.277249 1.85 0.327751 2.08
Issues per year 0.05497 26.99 0.053416 26.51 0.058789 25.27
Not for Profit 0.018598 0.48 -0.00338 -0.09 0.092175 1.92
Impact Factor 0.052885 5.34 -0.20623 -3.24 0.939
Impact Factor squared -0.00148 -3.66 0.011349 3.67 0.7668
Number of journals subcribed 0.002928 7.27 0.002788 6.96 0.003291 7.59
Number of journals subcribed squared -0.0000025 -6.93 -0.0000024 -6.68 -0.0000028-7.24
ELSEVIER -0.67291 -5.04 -0.61755 -4.66 -0.73646 -5.14
ELSEVIER*UK 0.787239 10.71 0.795138 10.81 0.7371 9.11
BLACKWELL -0.24535 -3.51 -0.21315 -3.07 -0.25351 -3.43
SPRINGER 0.352711 2.89 0.371081 3.05 0.278663 2.14
WILEY 0.859807 12.74 0.876496 12.97 0.871627 12.12
TAYLOR 0.432182 4.54 0.478398 5 0.339683 3.13
KLUWER 0.782093 5.75 0.794959 5.85 0.72055 4.95
US -0.1422 -1.22 -0.16876 -1.45 -0.06112 -0.48
UK 0.137204 1.15 0.115541 0.97 0.153665 1.23
FR -0.42719 -2.91 -0.39884 -2.73 -0.50972 -3.29
DE 0.601216 3.71 0.589322 3.64 0.643883 3.79
Med*US -0.18837 -1.22 -0.22309 -1.45 -0.1458 -0.89
Med*UK -0.22493 -1.5 -0.26253 -1.75 -0.13939 -0.87
Med*DE -0.22657 -1.27 -0.23423 -1.32 -0.19856 -1.06
Demand Parameters: Deterministic components of the expected utility of the journal
Cost Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's expected marginal cost
Endogenous Impact Factor
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
No Impact Factor Exogenous Impact Factor
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1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage
Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared
Med*FR -0.40867 -2.22 -0.39988 -2.18 -0.44822 -2.31
1998 0.071393 0.99 0.066489 0.93 0.092056 1.21
1999 0.204344 2.82 0.192782 2.66 0.19154 2.48
2000 0.158106 2.1 0.149734 1.99 0.16992 2.13
1996 -0.04349 -0.91 -0.04561 -0.95 -0.03483 -0.69
1997 -0.0617 -1.32 -0.06611 -1.42 -0.06188 -1.26
2002 0.159431 3.55 0.152351 3.4 0.1834 3.87
2003 0.253401 5.51 0.246385 5.38 0.284953 5.8
2004 0.508324 8.34 0.492197 8.1 0.532552 8.37
alpha 0.002301 23.73 0.3137 0.002298 25.09 0.284 0.002289 28.69 0.197
sigma 0.916604 48.41 0.3855 0.913516 47.73 0.3773 0.947747 30.61 0.4614
Nb of Observations 3834 3834 3834
Value of the Objective Function 0.1 0.11 0.1
Lagged Impact Factor x
Lagged Logarithm of Market Share
Other Instruments x x x
Parameters of Interest
Instruments
Statistics
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Table A1b: Econometric Estimates of the model for journal subscription is by university libraries  
(Continued)
Without Impact factor equation With Third Equation
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage
Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared
Constant -3.98601 -13.12 -3.94563 -13.07 -3.94929 -13.09
Economics 0.474088 2.97 0.471796 2.96 0.471476 2.96
Engineering 0.662144 5.42 0.657903 5.4 0.657548 5.39
Mathematics 1.023176 7.59 1.01954 7.56 1.019554 7.56
Physics 1.694655 10.89 1.689833 10.86 1.690642 10.82
Chemistry 1.466615 10.03 1.461576 10 1.462248 9.97
Probability and Statistics -0.96948 -4.74 -0.97947 -4.79 -0.97938 -4.79
Medicine 2.509763 7.2 2.505735 7.2 2.504814 7.2
Issues per year 0.175418 23.98 0.175439 23.98 0.175556 23.36
Impact Factor 0.022972 1.76 0.9391 0.023015 1.76 0.9391 0.022985 1.76 0.9391
ELSEVIER 0.232138 1.78 0.234539 1.8 0.234311 1.79
ELSEVIER*UK 1.273516 7.39 1.270755 7.38 1.272087 7.35
BLACKWELL 0.215272 1.65 0.215204 1.65 0.215155 1.65
SPRINGER 0.764315 2.8 0.764455 2.8 0.764861 2.8
WILEY 1.82938 11.19 1.828864 11.19 1.83022 11.12
TAYLOR 0.747987 3.43 0.745931 3.42 0.746547 3.42
KLUWER 0.962692 3.19 0.962376 3.19 0.962967 3.19
US 0.145488 0.55 0.14715 0.55 0.14701 0.55
UK 0.639405 2.35 0.640794 2.35 0.640968 2.35
FR 0.078974 0.24 0.078181 0.23 0.077656 0.23
DE 1.848111 4.97 1.85017 4.98 1.851288 4.97
Med*US -0.5959 -1.69 -0.58707 -1.67 -0.58714 -1.67
Med*UK -0.93479 -2.71 -0.92609 -2.69 -0.92656 -2.69
Med*DE -0.91698 -2.25 -0.90875 -2.23 -0.90931 -2.23
Med*FR -0.66033 -1.57 -0.66446 -1.58 -0.66433 -1.58
1996 -0.208 -1.61 -0.21791 -1.69 -0.2163 -1.68
1997 -0.15579 -1.23 -0.17309 -1.37 -0.17151 -1.35
1998 -0.22174 -1.25 -0.24327 -1.38 -0.24124 -1.37
1999 0.055848 0.33 0.038929 0.23 0.041145 0.24
2000 0.648726 3.57 0.627802 3.47 0.630118 3.48
2001 -0.2175 -1.87 -0.23045 -2 -0.22787 -1.98
2002 0.106736 0.86 0.094722 0.77 0.096363 0.78
2003 0.323134 2.7 0.315789 2.64 0.317555 2.66
2004 1.667909 10.8 1.651003 10.75 1.652377 10.76
Constant 5.123236 29.15 5.162608 31.05 5.153334 31.09
Economics -0.25618 -3.48 -0.26324 -3.65 -0.25914 -3.6
Engineering 0.107228 1.66 0.090465 1.47 0.096974 1.58
Mathematics 0.268612 3.37 0.25106 3.35 0.258988 3.46
Physics 0.654202 8.79 0.638746 8.77 0.636585 8.76
Chemistry 0.663808 9.73 0.65069 9.74 0.643245 9.64
Probability and Statistics -0.50288 -4.72 -0.50221 -4.88 -0.4996 -4.86
Medicine 0.322517 2.05 0.29355 1.9 0.288577 1.87
Issues per year 0.058323 25.27 0.058116 25.77 0.057696 25.76
Not for Profit 0.085614 1.79 0.084657 1.86 0.078836 1.74
Impact Factor -0.18831 -3.01 0.9391 -0.19277 -3.49 0.9391 -0.17692 -3.26 0.9391
Impact Factor squared 0.010462 3.44 0.7672 0.010664 3.97 0.7675 0.009879 3.75 0.7679
Number of journals subcribed 0.003244 7.5 0.00322 7.66 0.003177 7.57
Number of journals subcribed squared -0.00000282 -7.15 -0.0000028-7.34 -0.00000277-7.25
ELSEVIER -0.72402 -5.07 -0.7152 -5.13 -0.70388 -5.06
ELSEVIER*UK 0.739392 9.15 0.732868 9.35 0.734738 9.38
BLACKWELL -0.24919 -3.37 -0.24835 -3.44 -0.24444 -3.38
SPRINGER 0.285175 2.19 0.282724 2.22 0.288484 2.27
WILEY 0.870773 12.11 0.865838 12.29 0.864956 12.28
TAYLOR 0.348096 3.22 0.339626 3.25 0.346935 3.32
KLUWER 0.723224 4.97 0.713251 5.03 0.715403 5.04
US -0.0685 -0.54 -0.06368 -0.52 -0.07016 -0.57
UK 0.150433 1.2 0.150073 1.22 0.147191 1.2
FR -0.50048 -3.23 -0.50199 -3.31 -0.49371 -3.25
DE 0.638166 3.76 0.635518 3.82 0.630323 3.79
Med*US -0.15056 -0.92 -0.13252 -0.83 -0.13655 -0.86
Med*UK -0.14766 -0.92 -0.13052 -0.83 -0.1377 -0.88
Demand Parameters: Deterministic components of the expected utility of the journal
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Endogenous Impact Factor Endogenous Impact Factor
Cost Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's expected marginal cost
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1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage
Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared
Med*DE -0.20047 -1.07 -0.18561 -1.01 -0.18715 -1.02
Med*FR -0.44367 -2.29 -0.44336 -2.34 -0.43925 -2.31
1998 0.090563 1.19 0.080794 1.09 0.079404 1.07
1999 0.191711 2.48 0.188895 2.5 0.189047 2.51
2000 0.168679 2.11 0.161417 2.07 0.160274 2.05
1996 -0.03538 -0.7 -0.03622 -0.73 -0.03671 -0.74
1997 -0.06188 -1.26 -0.07347 -1.53 -0.07355 -1.53
2002 0.180726 3.81 0.173055 3.73 0.170593 3.68
2003 0.281929 5.74 0.281109 5.86 0.278403 5.8
2004 0.527998 8.3 0.498748 8.01 0.494366 7.95
Physics 0.053049 1.12 0.053016 1.12
Chemistry 0.191103 4.34 0.191064 4.34
Medicine 0.219368 10.13 0.219341 10.13
Engineering 0.07649 2.28 0.07643 2.28
Lagged Impact Factor 0.928097 225.92 0.928097 225.92
Dummy for Change of Editor -0.00331 -0.17 -0.00318 -0.16
Issues per year 0.005872 4.45 0.005871 4.45
Not for Profit 0.170104 4.79 0.170025 4.79
ELSEVIER -0.12339 -3.3 -0.12329 -3.3
BLACKWELL -0.10333 -2.26 -0.10328 -2.26
SPRINGER -0.14328 -2.46 -0.14324 -2.46
WILEY -0.10494 -1.99 -0.10492 -1.99
TAYLOR -0.07993 -1.12 -0.07993 -1.12
KLUWER -0.08072 -1.06 -0.08068 -1.06
ELETRONIC 0.111848 3.35 0.111702 3.34
alpha 0.002291 27.49 0.215 0.002291 27.5 0.2166 0.002293 26.48 0.234
sigma 0.947053 30.91 0.4616 0.952596 32.6 0.4695 0.952129 32.85 0.4702
Nb of Observations 3834 3834 3834
Value of the Objective Function 0,10 0,13 0,13
Lagged Impact Factor x
Lagged Logarithm of Market Share x x
Other Instruments x x x
Statistics
Instruments
Two sided Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's impact factor
Parameters of Interest
 
 
Table A2: List of instruments 
Lagged Cited Half Index 
Competitors' Price per field 
Competitors' nb of articles per field 
Number of articles published 
Number of competitors (publishers) 
Number of competitors per field 
Competitors' number of journals subscribed 
Competitors' number of titles 
Total R&D expenditures of the native country 
R&D expenditures of the native country from higher level education institutions 
R&D expenditures of the native country from government 
Total R&D expenditures of the native country squared 
R&D expenditures of the native country from higher level education institutions squared 
R&D expenditures of the native country from government squared 
Total R&D expenditures of the native country percentage GDP 
R&D expenditures of the native country from higher level education institutions percentage GDP 
R&D expenditures of the native country from government percentage GDP 
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Table A1m: Estimates of the model for Medicine journal subscription 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage
Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared
Constant -4.57007 -2.78 -6.70136 -3.47 -6.82595 -3.54
Issues per year 0.639385 9.2 0.628021 8.51 0.623019 8.45
Articles published in the year before 0.007948 3.36 0.005595 1.81 0.005606 1.82
Not for Profit -1.93393 -0.95 -1.34689 -0.19 -1.33368 -0.19
Not for Profit * Impact Factor -0.91127 -2.2 -1.47533 -0.76 0.7246 -1.49992 -0.77 0.7246
Impact Factor 0.700177 2.67 2.782862 3.69 0.9479 2.896628 3.84 0.9479
Impact Factor squared -0.01855 -1.44 -0.13272 -3.27 0.7846 -0.139 -3.43 0.7846
Diagnostic Specialties -1.41079 -1.63 -1.34084 -1.36 -1.3647 -1.39
Clinical Disciplines -0.55931 -0.83 -0.56525 -0.77 -0.57183 -0.78
Oncology -4.04844 -2.72 -4.22766 -2.69 -4.2124 -2.69
Genetics and Heredity 1.747609 1.46 1.742232 1.36 1.752948 1.37
Cardiac and Cardiovascular Diseases 3.462419 2.03 3.544719 1.96 3.522015 1.95
Number of fields covered 0.994024 2.06 1.052569 1.89 1.018634 1.83
Germany 3.536417 2.89 3.88992 2.99 3.920149 3.02
Total years of subscription -0.06132 -1.72 -0.07378 -1.91 -0.07507 -1.94
ELSEVIER 3.520068 4.51 3.565964 4.31 3.576722 4.33
SPRINGER 16.13124 9.84 16.80078 9.3 16.74268 9.28
WILEY 12.1514 7.78 11.37696 6.81 11.28586 6.77
KLUWER 4.889949 1.46 5.827208 1.65 5.71231 1.62
NATURE 2.718472 1.22 2.849745 1.2 2.695974 1.14
1996 -1.86538 -1.43 -2.17858 -1.57 -2.07076 -1.5
1997 -2.5896 -1.98 -3.12519 -2.24 -3.2069 -2.31
2001 -3.48077 -2.73 -3.91458 -2.81 -3.74397 -2.69
2002 -3.27316 -2.66 -4.21309 -3.04 -4.16661 -3.01
2003 -1.27748 -1.01 -2.40397 -1.74 -2.40908 -1.74
Constant 4.706799 35.34 4.551639 30.71 4.523452 30.64
Issues per year 0.031928 6.31 0.030903 5.85 0.030366 5.75
Articles published in current year 0.002156 6.34 0.001781 4.47 0.001804 4.54
Articles published in current year sqrd 0.00000152 -5.22 -0.00000139 -4.31 -0.00000143 -4.45
Total years of subscription -0.01237 -4.29 -0.013 -4.33 -0.01327 -4.44
Not For Profit -0.49956 -4.35 -0.60582 -4.86 -0.62289 -5
Impact Factor 0.111177 5.29 0.276537 4.56 0.9479 0.298175 4.94 0.9479
Impact Factor squared -0.00341 -3.27 -0.01256 -3.78 0.7846 -0.01376 -4.16 0.7846
Oncology -0.16634 -1.4 -0.18202 -1.47 -0.1808 -1.46
Genetics and Heredity 0.107917 0.79 0.105239 0.74 0.103315 0.72
Number of fields covered 0.13831 3.57 0.145438 3.61 0.140984 3.51
Germany 0.12793 1.3 0.151521 1.48 0.159023 1.56
ELSEVIER 0.326247 5.19 0.320698 4.9 0.323471 4.97
BLACKWELL 0.284636 4.31 0.274558 3.95 0.268335 3.88
NATURE 0.186084 1.03 0.207488 1.1 0.18317 0.98
SPRINGER 1.253069 11.05 1.27983 10.8 1.274677 10.81
WILEY 1.184148 10.27 1.10078 8.96 1.088131 8.9
KLUWER 1.041047 3.84 1.106724 3.91 1.087539 3.86
1996 -0.00267 -0.03 -0.02564 -0.23 -0.00734 -0.07
1997 -0.0326 -0.31 -0.07067 -0.64 -0.08677 -0.79
2001 0.108371 1.06 0.080394 0.75 0.11001 1.03
2002 0.153793 1.56 0.085269 0.81 0.092239 0.88
2003 0.353733 3.44 0.260609 2.34 0.258543 2.34
Constant 0.142438 3.55
Lagged Impact Factor 0.960018 126.96
Oncology 0.026609 0.3
Genetics and Heredity -0.10456 -1.19
Cardiac and Cardiovascular Diseases 0.083156 0.8
Not for Profit 0.158303 1.88
Issues per year 0.006508 1.72
Articles published in the year before -0.00002 -0.16
alpha 0.016291 18.07 0.3613 0.016557 15.94 0.3593 0.016522 15.96 0.3596
Nb of Observations 1030 1030 1030
Value of the Objective Function 0.18 0.21 0.25
Lagged Impact Factor x x
Other Instruments x x x
Note: the years 1998 to 2000 were not included in the analysis.
Demand Parameters: Deterministic components of the expected utility of the journal
With Impact factor equation
Model 1M Model 2M Model 3M
Exogenous Impact Factor Endogenous Impact Factor Endogenous Impact Factor
Cost Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's expected marginal cost
Statistics
Instruments
Two sided Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's impact factor
Parameter of Interest
 
  28 
Table A2m : Summary of Structural Estimates for Journals in Medicine 
                  
  Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity Marginal Cost Mark Up (Percentage) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Model 1M -11.85 -7.278 0.027 0.008 661.62 381.91 17.89 14.35 
Model 3M -12.65 -7.749 0.02 0.007 712.97 413.36 16.49 13.29 
                  
 
 
Table A3m: Structural Estimates for Journals in Medicine 
Model 1M: Impact Factor Exogenous
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Blackwell -11.383 -7.262 0.034 0.009 0.032 0.009 632.667 394.246 17.758 14.087 0.003 0.001
Cambridge -16.244 -5.794 0.017 0.007 0.016 0.006 932.138 293.947 17.942 17.302 0.001 0.001
Elsevier -11.439 -7.11 0.026 0.009 0.024 0.007 635.12 371.477 18.697 14.934 0.002 0.001
Kluwer -9.011 -5.895 0.029 0.008 0.026 0.007 488.868 288.091 25.613 19.841 0.005 0.001
Lippincot -12.425 -7.767 0.028 0.007 0.027 0.006 698.676 414.381 15.436 13.184 0.002 0.001
Oxford -10.655 -7.761 0.022 0.009 0.02 0.008 588.305 413.788 17.878 13.114 0.002 0.001
Sage -10.865 -8.526 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.006 600.038 461.242 16.434 11.76 0.001 0.001
Springer -13.441 -6.874 0.026 0.007 0.024 0.006 760.452 358.558 17.677 14.965 0.002 0.001
Taylor -14.084 -8.865 0.021 0.01 0.019 0.007 799.483 479.234 16.143 12.068 0.002 0.001
Wiley -12.111 -7.349 0.025 0.008 0.023 0.007 678.725 388.431 17.611 14.263 0.002 0.001
Model 3M: Impact Factor Endogenous with Equation
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Blackwell -12.2 -8.161 0.015 0.008 0.013 0.007 685.009 436.709 15.993 12.711 0.001 0.001
Cambridge -17.826 -5.783 0.019 0.006 0.017 0.005 1031.24 293.83 19.252 17.335 0.001 0.001
Elsevier -11.564 -7.644 0.017 0.007 0.016 0.006 645.885 405.11 17.259 13.74 0.002 0.001
Kluwer -10.696 -5.526 0.03 0.008 0.028 0.007 592.965 271.237 20.198 20.119 0.006 0.001
Lippincot -13.053 -8.064 0.024 0.006 0.023 0.006 738.613 433.825 15.153 12.717 0.002 0.001
Oxford -12.305 -8.257 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.007 691.49 442.114 16.183 12.453 0.001 0.001
Sage -11.288 -9.196 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 627.326 502.609 16.389 11.065 0.001 0.001
Springer -14.932 -7.143 0.027 0.006 0.025 0.006 853.681 377.146 16.655 14.134 0.002 0.001
Taylor -16.162 -10.488 0.024 0.011 0.021 0.007 928.281 583.125 14.519 9.535 0.002 0.001
Wiley -13.721 -8.958 0.025 0.007 0.024 0.007 778.9 487.303 15.985 11.58 0.002 0.001
Cross Editor Elasticity Marginal Cost Mark Up (Percentage) Market Shares
Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity Cross Editor Elasticity Marginal Cost Mark Up (Percentage) Market Shares
Own Elasticity Cross Elasticity
 
Note: The average market share of the outside option is around 72%. 
 
Table A4m: List of instruments for Journals in Medicine 
List of Instruments  
Lagged Logarithm of Market Share 
Lagged Cited Half Index and its squared value 
Competitors' average and median Prices 
Competitors' average and median nb of articles 
Number of competitors (publishers) 
Competitors' number of subcribed journals and its squared value 
Editor's number of subscribed journals 
Year step dummy for main editors offering electronic version of printed journals 
Total R&D expenditures of the native country and percentage GDP 
R&D expenditures of the native country from higher level education institutions and percentage GDP
R&D expenditures of the native country from government and percentage GDP 
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Table A4e: Estimates of the model for subscriptions on Journals in Economics 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage
Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared Estimate t Value R-squared
Constant -12.7336 -8.02 -13.2083 -7.99 -13.2757 -8.05
Issues per year 1.693541 5.62 1.643856 5.42 1.63594 5.4
Articles published in the year before 0.056969 3.38 0.060321 3.45 0.060334 3.45
Not for Profit -3.83472 -1.87 -4.62641 -2.16 -4.53969 -2.13
Impact Factor 1.266319 1.42 2.292711 2.1 0.744 2.44985 2.25 0.744
ELSEVIER 10.4301 7.17 10.28937 6.95 10.33945 7.03
SPRINGER 5.982034 1.25 6.074491 1.27 5.951031 1.25
WILEY 13.4808 3.35 13.19214 3.26 13.42739 3.33
KLUWER 5.624446 3.39 5.784766 3.44 5.641204 3.37
OXFORD 3.214535 1.25 3.978025 1.51 3.695827 1.41
Trend 0.71436 5.3 0.70732 5.18 0.707429 5.21
Constant 3.470096 13.9 3.420213 13.29 3.420796 13.32
Issues per year 0.168158 5.77 0.167013 5.7 0.165243 5.65
Not For Profit -0.51592 -1.89 -0.58638 -2.08 -0.56565 -2.01
Impact Factor 0.201848 1.77 0.308196 2.23 0.744 0.326578 2.36 0.744
Step dummy for change of publisher -0.11438 -0.91 -0.11582 -0.92 -0.1125 -0.9
Nb of journals subscribed per publisher 0.002163 1.66 0.002149 1.64 0.002206 1.69
Nb of journals subsc per publisher sqrd 0.00000347 -2.58 -0.00000352 -2.6 -0.00000334 -2.48
ELSEVIER 1.429095 3.22 1.432182 3.21 1.358366 3.05
SPRINGER 0.766432 1.25 0.780757 1.27 0.76314 1.25
WILEY 1.757871 3.46 1.723998 3.38 1.76326 3.48
TAYLOR 0.744847 2.15 0.731751 2.1 0.74339 2.14
KLUWER 1.228688 5.55 1.238761 5.55 1.220229 5.5
OXFORD 0.728563 2.16 0.794318 2.29 0.750001 2.18
Trend 0.075578 3.75 0.074986 3.69 0.072422 3.59
Constant 0.086368 1.49
Lagged Impact Factor 0.791324 20.52
Articles published in the year before -0.00127 -1.71
Issues per year 0.021556 1.8
Not for Profit 0.101171 1.56
alpha 0.022334 12.95 0.5787 0.022355 12.28 0.5824 0.022352 12.34 0.5812
Nb of Observations 228 228 228
Value of the Objective Function 0.35 0.34 0.54
Lagged Impact Factor x x
Other Instruments x x x
Note: the years 1998 to 2000 were not included in the analysis.
Model 1E Model 2E Model 3E
Exogenous Impact Factor Endogenous Impact Factor Endogenous Impact Factor
Statistics
Instruments
Parameter of Interest
With Impact factor equation
Demand Parameters: Deterministic components of the expected utility of the journal
Cost Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's expected marginal cost
Two sided Parameters: Deterministic components of the journal's impact factor
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Table A2e: Structural Estimates for Journals in Economics  
Model 3E: Impact Factor Endogenous with Equation
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
American Economic 
Association -3.481 -3.591 0.202 0.025 0.179 0 117.038 116.664 28.963 27.85 0.054 0.007
Blackwell -5.269 -4.041 0.047 0.021 0.045 0.02 185.709 128.59 32.582 31.862 0.01 0.005
Cambridge -3.933 -2.506 0.039 0.021 0.029 0.009 131.394 67.417 35.933 40.01 0.012 0.006
Elsevier -20.136 -18.437 0.227 0.092 0.221 0.088 855.855 772.806 8.817 6.717 0.01 0.006
International Monetary 
Fund -1.21 -1.257 0.053 0.009 0.045 0 9.645 11.584 83.017 79.534 0.043 0.007
Kluwer -13.547 -12.381 0.082 0.051 0.07 0.043 563.367 509.658 9.68 8.221 0.006 0.005
M I T  Press Journals -5.24 -5.305 0.179 0.03 0.153 0 196.311 193.512 19.28 18.893 0.028 0.006
Oxford -4.608 -4.671 0.031 0.025 0.024 0.017 161.536 163.702 27.902 22.093 0.007 0.005
Sage -9.647 -4.407 0.058 0.02 0,000 0 389.199 153.172 21.253 22.692 0.005 0.005
Springer -13.951 -13.288 0.054 0.043 0.008 0 581.566 552.481 20.076 19.556 0.005 0.005
Taylor -10.19 -8.753 0.156 0.045 0.118 0.006 417.155 349.082 11.131 11.5 0.012 0.006
The Rand Journal Of 
Economics -3.763 -3.763 0.182 0.182 0.156 0.156 129.496 129.496 26.638 26.638 0.046 0.046
University Of Chicago P -3.607 -4.459 0.026 0.017 0.023 0.013 113.639 151.371 39.415 24.38 0.012 0.005
Wiley -16.826 -17.493 0.183 0.07 0.116 0.014 715.759 751.22 6.746 6.05 0.01 0.006
All Journals in 
Economics -11.197 -6.943 0.121 0.042 0.11 0.033 456.043 265.266 21.675 16.399 0.012 0.006
Mark Up (Percentage) Market SharesOwn Elasticity Cross Elasticity Cross Editor Elasticity Marginal Cost
 
Note: The average market share of the outside option is around 52%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3e: List of instruments for Journals in Economics 
 
Lagged Logarithm of Market Share 
Lagged Cited Half Index  
Competitors' average and median Prices 
Competitors' median impact factor 
Number of competitors (publishers) 
Competitors' number of journals and subcribed journals 
Dummy for journals that have an open access policy (REPEC)  and its interaction with time the policy started 
Year step dummy for main editors offering electronic version of printed journals 
Total R&D expenditures of the native country and percentage GDP 
R&D expenditures of the native country from higher level education institutions and percentage GDP 
R&D expenditures of the native country from government and percentage GDP 
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